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The rise of the Internet and social media reignites interest in collective intelligence. We 
frame collective intelligence as follows: (1) Simple aggregation of individual opinion is a 
poor substitute for reasoned opinion by collectives (i.e., deliberation) except in limited 
circumstances. (2) What constitutes an intelligent decision on complex matters requires 
approximations to the ideal of what is intelligent. There is no “gold standard” for intelli­
gent decisions. (3) If collective deliberation is to be useful, then its outcomes must be im­
proved decisions—in short, intelligent outcomes. (4) Deliberation can lead to more intelli­
gent outcomes when opinion, knowledge, and judgment within a collective is diverse and 
this diversity is expressed. (5) The trends within emerging media toward increasingly nar­
row, partisan sources of information, toward selective exposure and avoidance, and to­
ward balkanization of collectives will depress the possibilities of collective intelligence 
that emerging media would on their surface seem to enhance.
Keywords: deliberation, decision making, Condorcet theorem, collective intelligence, expert opinion, groups
THE Internet has created substantial interest in and use of various forms of online collec­
tives to generate knowledge and information and even to solve scientific problems. The 
best-known example is Wikipedia and its variants, which allow a wide variety of contribu­
tors and contributions that distill content through a combination of bottom-up and top-
down processes. News outlets have allowed and even encouraged readers to offer sub­
stantive commentary on articles while communicating back to the readership which top­
ics are being widely read, forwarded, and liked. Other more complex processes provide 
recommendations for movies, books, and products tailored to the interests of each user 
based on content and preference similarities, also known as recommendation systems 
(Adomavicius and Tuzhilin, 2005).
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Some scholars identify all these examples as types of collective intelligence, casting a 
wide net to include the blogosphere and the many forms of social media as falling under 
the umbrella of collective intelligence (Alag, 2009). Any process by which information is 
collected and aggregated is treated by some as a case of collective intelligence (Betten­
court, 2009). This approach is too broad, in our opinion, both as a way to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of collective information generation and certainly for the de­
mands of this chapter.
Instead, we restrict our focus to collectives of individual who identify themselves as a 
group or not (voters in a congressional district as well as a company’s board of directors), 
who must make a decision on some issue (voting for a congressional candidate; granting 
health insurance to domestic partners in the company) and who are in direct deliberation 
(board) or essentially independent decision-makers. Collective intelligence (or (p. 778)
foolishness), in our view, requires an assessment of the quality of the decision reached by 
the collective through deliberation or through simple aggregation of judgments.1 The fo­
cus here is on the role of deliberation in enhancing or undermining collective intelligence 
with collective decisions of a large group of independent (that is, nondeliberating) per­
sons serving as the baseline of comparison.
The core issue surrounding the value and utility of these collective deliberations is cap­
tured in two articles appearing in the New York Times in the span of just a few days in 
early 2012. One extols the effectiveness of collaborative scientific inquiries made possible 
in large part by the ease with which collective groups of scientists can come together to 
work on common problems with differential but relevant expertise (Lin, 2012). The other 
makes clear (Cain, 2012) that intelligent, creative outcomes are as likely and sometimes 
more likely when people are allowed the solitude and concentration of individual deliber­
ation. At heart, these articles contrast the power of group versus individual deliberation—
the core question raised in this chapter. Are collectives capable of being more intelligent 
than the individuals making them up? If so, under what conditions will the deliberation of 
collectives yield greater wisdom than foolishness?
Although the upsurge in interest in various forms of collective intelligence—as well as its 
benefits and pitfalls—appears to be the result of increased attention to emerging media, 
the idea of collective intelligence is, in fact, an old one, having its roots in the work of 
John Dewey (1927, 1993), the group social psychologies of the 1950s, and studies in polit­
ical communication extolling the value of deliberation for successful democracy. The core 
questions that emerged early in these arenas include whether groups could make better 
decisions than individuals and under what conditions, whether discussion assisted in the 
decision-making process or whether the simple aggregation of individual opinion was suf­
ficient to enhance the quality of a decisional outcome, and under what conditions groups 
produced poorer—foolish—decisions rather than wiser ones.
In this chapter, we take up the question of collective intelligence through a broad review 
of pertinent literature crafting the following framework for collective intelligence: (1) 
Simple aggregation of individual opinion (or judgment) is a poor substitute for reasoned 
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opinion by collectives (i.e., deliberation) except in limited circumstances. However, the 
simple aggregation of opinions serves as the baseline for any improvement in intelligence 
by a collective. (2) There is no “gold standard” for intelligent decisions by groups except 
in the case of uninteresting problems such as how many colored balls there are in a large 
jar. What constitutes an intelligent decision on consequential matters of ethics, public pol­
icy, or governance requires approximations to the ideal of what is intelligent. (3) The re­
search on deliberation in various types of collectivities has suffered from many problems
—weak or nonexistent theoretical explanations, causal direction, nonindependence of ob­
servations, insufficient control, missing data, failure to show that discussion content is 
linked to outcomes, outcomes that are inconsequential to participants, the absence of any 
stake in the decision by deliberants, and so on. The most significant problem, however, 
has been the failure to identify outcomes that are somehow better or worse—that is more 
and less intelligent—as the crucial consequence of deliberative activity. Instead, out­
comes have included opinion change, equality of (p. 779) contributions, satisfaction or dis­
satisfaction, feelings of isolation or connection, reports of greater or lesser tolerance, and 
so forth (Delli Carpini et al., 2004). If collective deliberation is to be useful, then its out­
comes must be improved decisions, more accurate conclusions, solutions to problems that 
work—in short, intelligent outcomes by some standard. (4) Collective deliberations will 
sometimes yield greater foolishness than wisdom, poorer rather than better decisions, 
less effective or efficient solutions. Understanding the conditions which can enhance and 
retard collective intelligence is a challenge for the research community. We will examine 
some established factors, specifically diversity of opinion and information and its impact 
on collective intelligence. (5) We conclude that deliberation in collective units within soci­
ety can lead to more intelligent outcomes when opinion, knowledge, and judgment within 
a collective is diverse at the outset and when this diversity is expressed and thus made 
available to others in deliberation. (6) This suggests that the trends within emerging me­
dia toward increasingly narrow, partisan sources of information, toward selective expo­
sure and avoidance, and toward balkanization of collectives will depress the possibilities 
of collective intelligence that emerging media would on their surface seem to enhance.
A Baseline for Intelligent Collective Judg­
ments: The Condorcet Jury Theorem
Cass Sunstein (2006) begins Infotopia with a discussion of the Condorcet jury theorem 
(CJT), which sets an important baseline against which to compare any collective decision 
made by a group in interaction to that aggregate decision of a group of people not in in­
teraction. The CJT asks “under what conditions does the aggregate, independent judg­
ment of a set of individuals yield a better outcome than the most competent person alone 
or any random person alone?”
Let us suppose that you have a decision to make with two choices, A and B (Stanford or 
Yale; Romney or Gingrich; policy X will work versus backfire; more white or colored balls 
in a large jar). You can make the decision on your own or you can consult a number of 
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other people and just get their votes (not their knowledge or their commentary). Which of 
the following would give the best decision and under what conditions? Your decision ig­
noring everyone else; the average decision of the group (e.g., 55 percent say Yale); the 
average decision of the most competent members of the group?
The answer in general is the average of the group’s judgments. This is true in general but 
a variety of conditions need to exist. They include the following: a single, simple, distinct 
decision (i.e., A or B), no obvious bias affecting everyone in the group (e.g., color blind­
ness, or all rich, or all alumni, or all pessimists); rational deliberators seeking the correct 
decision, not necessarily a decision that will undermine the process (e.g., voting for a 
write-in because democracy is a perversion!). The idea here is that averages of (p. 780)
judgments are reasonable indicators and better indicators of decisions than is the case 
for any individual choice, given a clear decision in the face of uncertainty. For example, 
one would never use this approach in bridge design using a general population because 
the likelihood of being wrong (the probability of correct decisions not being greater than .
50) for a large number of people in the sample is quite high. The CJT sets out a criterion
against which decisions by deliberating groups should be set: Does deliberation enhance
the quality of the outcome over what it would be for N people who did not deliberate?
The CJT also suggests that simple aggregation of individual judgments can often be suc­
cessful, so that in this simple sense collectives have a very real chance of being intelli­
gent under a variety of circumstances, although certainly not in general. The CJT has of­
ten been tested with relatively simple rather than complex or nuanced tasks (such as poli­
cy preferences or ethical decisions). So one issue that must be addressed is whether it is 
even possible to consider tasks with no clear correct or incorrect outcome. If not, then 
our ability to study collective intelligence may be so stymied and thus remain merely the­
oretical.
Is There a Gold Standard for Intelligent Deci­
sions?
With simple technical problems such as the “desert survival problem” or group solutions 
to a sodoku puzzle, the quality or speed of the solution can be assessed. However, such 
technical problems are not very interesting and say little about real-world solutions to re­
al-world problems, such as national debt reduction. Mercier and Landemore (2012) argue 
that even in the case of moral and complex policy decisions, some criteria for better out­
comes are possible. Although the actual success of a selected policy may have to await fu­
ture outcomes, Mercier and Landemore argue that the “epistemic bases” for such deci­
sions are themselves indirect measures of the possible success of the policy selected. 
They hold that the epistemologic bases for successful decisions are important and neces­
sary, although not sufficient, conditions for intelligent decisions.
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In previous research, we have taken a similar approach, arguing that a particular mea­
sure of opinion quality—called argument repertoire (Cappella, Price and Nir, 2002)—is an 
indicator of enhanced epistemic grounding for opinion and, therefore, a necessary indica­
tor of increased intelligence in group deliberations. Argument repertoire (AR) is derived 
from the conceptual and empirical work by Kuhn (1991) on reasoning in daily life. She fo­
cuses less on what people think than on why they think it. Kuhn’s real innovation is direct­
ly eliciting and assessing counterarguments.
The generation of counter-arguments requires people to envision conditions that would 
falsify their explanations. This level of reasoning, especially if accompanied by genuine 
counterevidence, suggests a sophisticated knowledge of the topic well beyond that repre­
sented by reasons and evidence for one’s own position. In several applications, (p. 781)
coders were able to make reliable assessments of the relevant reasons people have for 
their opinions and reasons that others might have for holding opposed opinions.
AR is also a valid measure of anchored opinion. Those with higher AR are better educat­
ed, have greater political knowledge, more interest in politics, more exposure and atten­
tion to news, higher interpersonal communication about politics, more commitment to 
their political parties, and are older (Cappella, Price, and Nir, 2002). Respondents with 
higher AR scores are more likely to participate in online discussion groups and, once 
there, to talk more on topic and offer more arguments. Most important, AR is sensitive to 
the effects of deliberation. Those exposed to substantive conversation on specific issues 
have elevated AR scores after discussion (Cappella, Price, and Nir, 2002).
AR sidesteps the question of accuracy of reasons and evidence in favor of a simpler but 
effective measure of anchored opinion. When AR is coupled with standard measures of 
domain-specific factual knowledge, the two begin to triangulate the epistemic bases for 
intelligent decisions, as Mercier and Landemore would argue.
However, AR and domain-specific factual knowledge cannot be considered anything but 
indicators of intelligence regarding an issue. How can preferred solutions be assessed as 
wise or foolish other than waiting for future outcomes that may never be realized? One 
solution to this problem is to use aggregate expert opinion as a criterion for judging the 
success of open-ended problems. While there is no guarantee that expert opinion will 
yield solutions that work objectively in the real world, opinion from such a group—not 
from individual experts, mind you, but a group—has a higher probability of working and 
being fully informed than does the opinion of nonexperts or the opinion of an individual 
randomly selected expert, at least that is what the CJT would suggest. Such experts offer 
a greater chance of meeting the criteria set forward for success in the CJT, namely that 
their individual judgments have a probability above chance of being correct so that—in 
the absence of other serious biases—their aggregate opinion would be more likely to con­
stitute a wise outcome than would be the case for a random set of individuals or a ran­
domly selected expert.
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Although no unassailable standard for assessing intelligent decisions is able to be stated, 
a combination of criteria establishes the epistemic bases for intelligent decisions and ag­
gregate opinion of domain-specific experts as standards against which individual and 
group judgment can be assessed.2
Intelligent (and Foolish) Outcomes from Delib­
erating Groups
Intelligent Outcomes
Substantial evidence supports the finding that groups in deliberation can in some cases 
produce enhanced decisions in contrast to individuals or even in comparison to the
(p. 782) most competent member. This has been true with mathematical and logical prob­
lems (Laughlin and Ellis, 1986; Moshman and Geil, 1998), induction problems (Laughlin, 
Bonner, and Miner, 2002), causes of death (Sniezek and Henry, 1989), project teams with 
a group history working outside the laboratory (Michaelsen, Watson, and Black, 1989, see 
also Bainbridge, 2002; Watson, Michaelsen, and Sharp, 1991; West and Anderson, 1996). 
In the research on deliberation in political science and political communication, there is a 
sense that more intelligent outcomes result (Barabas, 2000; Cook and Jacobs, 1998;
Fishkin and Luskin, 2005; Gastil and Dillard, 1999), reviewers of this literature acknowl­
edge (Mackie, 2006; Mercier and Landemore, 2012) the tenuous relationship between the 
outcome measured in most of these studies and real intelligence. For example, opinion 
change resulting from discussion is not a clear indicator of wisdom or foolishness, as 
opinions can polarize in undesirable directions.
Research from our own projects on deliberation and intelligence are worth highlighting 
as well. One project (gPOD3 for “genetics, public opinion, and deliberation”) focused on 
deliberation by groups sampled from the general public (8 to 12 per group) who met on­
line synchronously on three separate occasions to discuss ethical issues about genetics 
testing and research. Participants provided information on the epistemic bases for deci­
sion quality at various points including factual knowledge about genetics, AR regarding 
participation in genetics research, and structures of semantic and social networks de­
rived from open-ended responses.
The key comparisons are between those deliberating and others in various nondeliberat­
ing control conditions. Young Min Baek (2010) explored changes in factual knowledge by 
investigating the effects of deliberation participation on a citizen’s basic genetic knowl­
edge change. Active deliberation reduced “uncertainty,” in that participants became bet­
ter informed by replacing uncertain knowledge with accurate knowledge. Discussion of 
bioethical issues mainly influences the “certainty” of their knowledge, which helps the 
public form more accurate understanding of an issue and thus contribute to stable and 
solidified opinion. Deliberation, however, does not seem to correct misinformation.
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AR was also affected by deliberative activity in contrast to nondeliberating controls (Kim 
and Cappella, 2010). The quality of opinion—measured as the reasons for one’s own and 
for other’s opposed views—is higher for those deliberating than for those not deliberating 
and especially for those deliberating twice or more in contrast to those not deliberating. 
The findings are consistent across multiple topics about ethical issues in genetics (e.g., 
from “duty to warn” to “volunteering”). Deliberation affected the basis of opinion. In sup­
port of the importance of opinion anchors, Kim and Cappella (2010) also showed those 
with more anchored opinions having greater opinion stability over time than those with 
opinions formed without deliberation.
In his dissertation, Young Min Baek (2011)—also using gPOD data—examined the effect of 
deliberation on both social and semantic networks while taking into account the positivity 
and negativity of concepts. A small set of themes was identified as capturing a large per­
centage of ethical issues regarding genetics. Four outcome measures were examined 
from the network of social and semantic connections: (1) size—for (p. 783) example, how 
many ties a node has in a given social network; (2) range—for example, how many media­
tions a node enables between nodes in a given social or semantic graph; (3) integration—
for example, the degree of interconnection within a set of nodes with the same valence in 
a given network; and (4) differentiation—for example, the degree of disconnection be­
tween two sets of nodes with opposite valence in a given network.
The most pertinent conclusions are as follows: (1) Deliberation about bioethical issues in 
genetics made people and concepts more highly interconnected than controls. (2) The 
dominant valence of the group’s discussion (pro or con messages) increased (network) 
solidarity between people of the same valence. (3) Postdiscussion semantic networks 
were the result of both prediscussion networks and, more importantly, group-level seman­
tic networks emerging from deliberation (51 of 60 groups).
Results from the gPOD project so far are encouraging regarding the epistemic bases for 
intelligent decisions by deliberating groups. However, gPOD has not yet employed the 
opinions of bioethicists as a comparison standard for deliberating versus nondeliberating 
participants. However, in an earlier deliberation study on healthcare reform, experts were 
a part of the sample whose positions offered a specific comparison to non expert mem­
bers of the public.
Studies using protocols similar to gPOD have investigated health policy problems and so­
lutions. One particularly important set of findings yielded the following pattern: that (1) 
groups’ views on health policy change through deliberation in contrast to those not delib­
erating; (2) the change is in the direction of elite opinion on healthcare policy as revealed 
in baseline surveys; and (3) change is not dependent on having elites in the deliberating 
group (Price, Feldman, Freres, Cappella, and Zhang, 2005). For example, elite opinion 
does not favor tax solutions to health insurance problems initially, whereas citizen opinion 
does; but citizen opinion changes toward that of elites on this issue even when elites are 
not in the deliberating group. These results are encouraging.
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Other evidence from the healthcare dialogue study indicates that discussion increases the 
complexity of opinion structures (Price, Arnold, Baek, and Cappella, 2009). Confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling (SEM) were used to examine the 
latent dimensions underlying multiple opinions on healthcare policies and then to test the 
impact of participation in the online discussions on that latent structure. Results indicate 
that deliberation produced a significantly more complex and differentiated structure of 
opinions. Comparisons between “elite” and nonelite respondents further indicate that this 
deliberation-induced change can be confidently interpreted as reflecting an increase in 
cognitive sophistication.
Baek and Cappella (2010) have studied the complexity of expressed opinion (not self-re­
ported opinion) in discussing issues in healthcare reform over two time periods. Ordinary 
citizens and experts’ are compared after having discussions with other experts at time 
one; the expressions at time two show that ordinary citizens’ become more complex while 
those of experts become less complex. These findings indicate that citizens learn the com­
plexities of healthcare options over time from a low base, while experts refine the com­
plex views with which they begin to become more focused on the positions they believe 
are most effective.
(p. 784) Both existing and new research indicate that deliberation can affect both the epis­
temic bases for and quality of policy recommendations with deliberation. This conclusion 
certainly does not and cannot mean that deliberating groups will necessarily produce in­
telligent outcomes.
Foolish Decisions
Groups do not always make better decisions. Summaries of the literature make clear that 
certain processes common in group deliberation can distort the information available to 
discussants through suppression of minority opinion, polarization, and the development of 
risky shifts (Laughlin, 2011; Turner, 1991). Sunstein (2002, 2008) popularized some of the 
problems in group deliberation using language that makes clear their consequences for 
collective intelligence. (1) The predeliberation errors of group members can be amplified, 
not merely propagated, as a result of deliberation. (2) Groups may fall victim to cascade 
effects, as the judgments of initial speakers or actors are followed up in successive com­
mentary, while contrary information is withheld (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 
1992; Chamley, 2004). Nondisclosure may be a product of either informational or reputa­
tional cascades. (3) Group polarization can lead to more extreme judgments in line with 
the group’s predeliberation dispositions (Nocetti, 2008). Although polarization can lead in 
desirable directions, there is no assurance of this consequence. (4) In deliberating 
groups, shared information often dominates or crowds out unshared information, reduc­
ing diversity of information and ensuring that groups do not acquire the full range of in­
formation available.
Collective Intelligence: The Wisdom and Foolishness of Deliberating Groups
Page 9 of 17
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Factors Affecting Intelligent Decision-Making 
Through Deliberation
Researchers have long held that high-quality group decisions depend on the diversity of 
opinion expressed in group deliberations. Taylor and Faust (1952) claimed that group de­
cisions were superior to individual decisions because groups presented more views of the 
problem and greater information pertinent to solutions. Since Janis (1982) proposed that 
successful handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 resulted in part from Robert 
Kennedy playing the role of “devil’s advocate,” this has been considered one of the proto­
typical intervention strategies to improve group decision-making performance. The mech­
anism for improved decisions in “devil’s advocate” (DA) procedures may very well be that 
it increases opinion diversity. SunWolf and Seibold (1999) conclude from their (p. 785) re­
view that the DA procedure improves group decisions; but the groups included only stu­
dents and focused on well-defined decision tasks. Salazar (1997) found that opinion simi­
larity in groups decreased task-relevant communication, while diverse prior opinions 
worked to enhance both communication and decision quality. Maznevski (1994) showed 
that ethnic and cultural diversity improved decision-making performance, again presum­
ably because the information about and frames for viewing alternative outcomes were 
more diverse. The evidence from controlled group experiments supports Stasser’s (1992)
conclusion that the quality of group decisions depends significantly on the diversity of in­
formation discussed. When status diversity reflects variance in knowledge, expertise, and 
values, then status diversity can increase the likelihood of high-quality decisions (Berger 
et al., 1977; Kirchler and Davis, 1986).
Research in political deliberation and political talk has shown that “disagreement” can 
provide exposure to multiple perspectives and is thus thought to foster the kind of careful 
reflection needed to arrive at a reasoned opinion. For example, Arendt (1968, 241) stress­
es the importance of exposure to oppositional views for encouraging an “enlarged mental­
ity,” or the ability to form a more representative, informed opinion by considering a par­
ticular issue from alternative standpoints. In the view of deliberative theorists, then, polit­
ical disagreement (or expressed diversity) should enhance learning. Social networks re­
search also suggests that weaker, more heterogeneous ties carry a higher likelihood of 
transmitting novel information (Granovetter, 1973; Weimann, 1982). Kwak, Williams, 
Wang, and Lee (2005) and Scheufele et al. (2004) found that talking with people from di­
verse sociopolitical backgrounds is related to political knowledge.
Exposure to political disagreement has shown that network diversity fosters a better un­
derstanding of multiple perspectives on issues (Mutz, 2002a; Price et al., 2002). The abili­
ty to rationalize other people’s viewpoints might be considered an indirect measure of 
fact-based issue knowledge. Although one’s repertoire of arguments may very well be ex­
panded via political disagreement, this is not to say that these arguments and the issues 
that support them are necessarily conveyed or interpreted accurately.
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Feldman and Price (2008), analyzing data from online group deliberations about the 2000 
presidential election, report an interaction effect between amount of political discussion 
and the perceived disagreement present in discussion networks. Those with the lowest 
levels of factual knowledge about political issues are embedded in low disagreement net­
works with little political talk. Those in high-disagreement networks or low-disagreement, 
high-talk networks have elevated issue knowledge. Although these data are about people 
talking politics with others, disagreement plays a consequential role in advancing issue 
knowledge measured as accurate responses on political issue questions.
Political deliberation is not the only source of support for claims about the importance of 
information heterogeneity. For example, Giles’s (2005) study compares the quality of
Wikipedia articles to those of the Encyclopedia Britannica in terms of the number of ac­
knowledged errors finding them comparable. Surowiecki (2005) (p. 786) suggests that the 
aggregate knowledge of a large group can be superior to that of a single or small set of 
experts when diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization, and aggregation char­
acterize the collective. Arazy, Morgan, and Patterson (2006) tested forty-two Wikipedia
articles to determine the effect of crowd size and diversity on article quality. Quality was 
defined as the number of errors; crowd size was the number of authors plus number of 
edits. Diversity was measured as the number of words in the discussion page and the 
number of edit wars. The results showed that size and diversity had positive effects on 
quality (see also Arazy, Nov, Patterson, and Yeo, 2011).
Woolley et al. (2010) had small groups of people working on a wide variety of tasks. The 
groups were shown to have a general “group intelligence,” in that performing well on one 
kind of task was also associated with performance on other quite unrelated tasks. This 
group intelligence is only weakly related to the average intelligence of individuals in the 
group or to the intelligence of the most intelligent person. However, it is strongly related 
to social sensitivity of the group members and to more symmetric distribution of discus­
sion in the group. This equality of discussion is important to information sharing and to 
effective performance on the assigned tasks. Group intelligence results in large part from 
social skills inviting the sharing of whatever diverse information and skill is present in the 
group.
Summary, Implications, and Next Steps
The purpose of this essay has been to invite researchers to reactivate interest in an old 
problem in the context of the interest created by emerging media in the promise of collec­
tive deliberation yielding intelligent outcomes. The old problem is obviously the situation 
in which groups produce higher-quality decisions than individuals in the context of inter­
action about those decisions. Our review suggests that deliberating groups can be effec­
tive in advancing the epistemic bases for good decisions and for enhancing the quality of 
decisions for certain types of tasks and for certain criteria for quality. In addition, some 
consensus in the research literature has emerged over the importance of expressed diver­
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sity of opinion, judgment, and knowledge as one important causal factor in assuring the 
effect of deliberations on decision quality.
However, many challenges remain. The criteria for defining a decision as intelligent 
rather than foolish are open to considerable debate, especially with open-ended tasks re­
garding policy, ethics, and governance. We have tried a variety of approaches in our work, 
including using factual knowledge and argument repertoire as indicators of the epistemic 
bases for intelligent decisions and comparisons to aggregate elite opinion as an indicator 
of the quality of a group’s decision. Approaches that move beyond simple opinions and 
judgments (even of experts) to more complex semantic network representations of com­
plex issues hold real promise, we believe (Baek, 2011; Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, and 
Atman, 2002), especially when aggregate semantic representations of (p. 787) elites are 
the comparison base for that of the deliberating group. In the end, there is no gold stan­
dard, but certainly the issue is worth attention.
Although deliberating collectives are capable of intelligent decisions, they are also capa­
ble of foolish ones. No comprehensive theoretical account has emerged for distinguishing 
the conditions for one or other type of decision even though specific factors such as diver­
sity of expressed information is certainly implicated in intelligent outcomes. Other factors 
that will need to be considered in any account distinguishing quality of decisions will be a 
theory of types of tasks and vested interest in the decision’s outcome. Both have received 
attention in the research literature (Hackman, 1969; McGrath, 1984), with the latter fac­
tor widely considered in the work on prediction markets.
As has been the case in much of the research on the consequences of political delibera­
tion, few convincing explanations have arisen for why deliberative processes should pro­
duce changes in tolerance, engagement, and social capital. The same is true of delibera­
tion and collective intelligence. Certainly arguments about bounded rationality, the analo­
gy to genetic diversity and survival, and other biological analogies have appeal. However, 
no strong causal account has arisen even to explain why collective deliberation can be in­
telligent.
If expressed diversity of opinion, judgment, and knowledge is as important to intelligent 
decisions as some research already suggests, then social, political, psychological, and me­
dia systems factors that increase the likelihood of the balkanization of knowledge and 
opinion will undermine the chances of intelligent deliberation. Jamieson and Cappella 
(2008) and many others have addressed this issue (Sunstein, 2001, 2009), but in the con­
text of a burgeoning interest in collective deliberation and intelligence, the effects of 
balkanized knowledge on deliberation—whether by elites or nonelites—take on renewed 
urgency.
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Notes:
(1.) Public opinion is not concerned with the quality of the outcome rendered by the ex­
pressed opinions, just their outcome.
(2.) Another approach to defining tasks whose outcomes can be compared to real-world 
decisions is the use of prediction markets to predict future events (Servan-Schreiber et 
al., 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004), such as the success of upcoming movies (Foutz 
and Jank, 2010), political stock markets (Forsythe et al., 1999) and sports betting markets 
(Spann and Skiera, 2009), as well as election outcomes (e.g., in contrast to political 
polling results) (Erikson and Wlezien, 2008; Pagon, 2005; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2009). 
However, these forums for collective intelligence replace deliberation with online mone­
tary decisions; therefore, while relevant to collective decision making, they are irrelevant 
to deliberative processes except under the most generous interpretation of the equiva­
lence of betting with the exchange of symbolic information.
(3.) Research from gPOD is mostly unpublished or currently under review. For a copy of 
the final report from this project, providing some of the detailed results and analyses, or 
for copies of individual papers cited, contact the first author.
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